THE JANUS FACES OF GOETHE: GOETHE ON THE NATURE, AIM, AND LIMIT OF SCIENTIFIC INVESTIGATION

Abstract

First will be investigated the trichotomy put forward at the Round Table discussion held at a Harvard conference on Goethe and the sciences in December, 1982: is Goethean science an alternative to or within modern science, or no alternative at all? It will be pointed to a surprising common feature in the seemingly contradictory views: in all three cases, however critical of Newton, Goethe is taken to have no doubts about the epistemic status of his own research. It will be thus focused on this, broader category, as opposed to a view (strengthening in the last decade) that treats Goethe as a fundamentally reflexive, sceptical thinker. It will be argued for the existence of such a polarity in Goethe´s scientific and methodological writings. For want of a better labelling, it will be called the poles na\`\ive and sceptic (not alluding to Schiller´s dichotomy of na\`\ive and sentimental), meaning, respectively, a non-reflexive, realist, ahistorical, `scientific absolutist´ , as opposed to a reflexive, historicising, language-conscious one. The existence of this polarity challenges the validity and shows the weaknesses of many of today´s accepted narratives concerning Goethe´s scientific endeavours and methodological utterances.