A Study on the Government Subsidies for CR Express Based on Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information

Authors

  • Qiwen Du
    Affiliation
    School of Economics and Management, Beijing Jiaotong University, China
  • Xianliang Shi
    Affiliation
    School of Economics and Management, Beijing Jiaotong University, China
https://doi.org/10.3311/PPtr.10743

Abstract

CHINA RAILWAY Express (CR express) refers to the international container train running in the East Asian Economic Circle and the developed European Economic Circle, and it is an important link in the development of “The Belt and Road”. However, as CR Express is still in the early stages of development, it is still on the way to fully market-oriented operations, and also has some problems such as high overall transportation cost, disorderly competition and other issues. From the perspective of government subsidies, this paper by searching the relationship in incomplete information dynamic game between local government and local relevant enterprises, gets the optimal subsidy amount for the government to obtain the maximum social benefit. The results can provide a reference for the government to formulate a reasonable subsidy policy and for the CR express to realize market-oriented.

Keywords:

CHINA RAILWAY Express, government subsidies, dynamic game, social benefit

Citation data from Crossref and Scopus

Published Online

2017-05-09

How to Cite

Du, Q., Shi, X. (2017) “A Study on the Government Subsidies for CR Express Based on Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information”, Periodica Polytechnica Transportation Engineering, 45(3), pp. 162–167. https://doi.org/10.3311/PPtr.10743

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Articles